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COVER: 88th Division Blue Devils stond guard 
on new ltolo-Jugoslav Boundary as set by big 
four in treaty of peace, now six months in ef-
fect. Premier Henri Bidault, whose country's 
proposal was the meeting ground for accord on 
this ticklish area solution, voiced the western 
powers· new proposal for the Trieste area. 
Today the American soldier in occupied areas 
holds a substantial responsibility ·for the im-
plementation of many MG functions and, by 
his presence in a governed area, has a marked 
effect upon the MG o,peration. 
The Opportunity 
"Never before in the history of the 
world has a group of men been off ercd 
a greater opportunity for service which 
promises so much for world peace," Dr. 
James R. Newman, Hesse MG Direc-
tor, told a graduating class of 34 Mili-
tary Government officers at the OMG-
US MG School at Oberammergau. 
In the principal address of the day, 
Newman went on to say, "In earlier 
wars, Military Government played a 
minor part and was important only in-
sofar as it aided the successful military 
commander in imposing his will upon 
a conquered people for an indefinite, 
· but usually short, period of time. To-
day, however, it plays an important and 
vital part in our war planning and has 
taken its place as an important mili-
tary function equal to that played by 
any branch of the armed forces . It is de-
signed to play its part after the din of 
battle ceases and is designed for a type 
of conquest, just as real but more subtle 
than that made by a successful fighting 
force: it is designed for the conquest 
of chaos, the conquest of fear held by 
a conquered people of riot, want, star-
vation, and further disaster, and the 
conquest of militaristic and totalitarian 
thought in a people abandoned by 
their leaders." 
In closing, Newman said, "In my 
opinion, the hope of the world as to its 
future peace and freedom from the hor-
rors of war lies in the accomplishment 
of a good job by Military Government 
and the forces in support thereof. With 
your help Military Government will 
guide the people of Germany to de-
mocracy and freedom, and through 
these things will give to the world that 
hope of eternal and universal peace 
which has ever been the dream of all 
mankind." 
There arc, throughout the country, 
many thousands of these Americans 
who, like Dr. Newman, have had their 
feet in the mud of occupied areas and 
who are in a singular position to un-
derstand what the United States has 
at stake in the realm of present interna-
tional affairs. The Military Government 
Association is designed to afford Mili-
tary Government personnel-officers 
and men of the Army and Navy, as 
well as civilians, an opportunity to make 
a genuine contribution to the realization 
of these objectives.-T11E EDITORS. 
MILITARY GOVERNMENT 
with the 
AIRBORNE COMMAND 
To prepare an adequate treatise on 
Military Government within an airborne 
command, would unquestionably require 
the combined talents of numerous experts 
in the highly refined phases of air and 
ground logistics, as well as in all branches 
of government. ln light of the kaleido-
scopic rapidity with which tactical, stra-
tegic and other changes are taking place 
in the concept of warfare throughout the 
world, the task would obviously be well-
nigh impossible. 
The writer has as his guide, only his 
experience as the Chief Military Govern-
ment officer with the famed 82nd Airborne 
Division for about thirty eventful days in 
the summer of 1944 during the invasion 
of Europe, and two years with the G-5 
Section of the First Army during the en· 
tirety of the North-European campaign 
and later in the Pacific theater. But, that 
experience did furnish a most compre-
hensive and realistic guide. The field in 
Europe included a highly organized econ-
omy and with a dense population which 
was in difficult circumstances. 
That there is, and will continue to be 
an increasing need for Military Govern-
ment staffs and units with airborne tacti-
cal units, hardly needs demonstration at 
this late date. The experience in Europe 
fully justifies that conclusion: It renders 
the further conclusion inevitable, that 
airborne forces must not only embrace 
self-contained Military Government staff 
sections, but must be accompanieci, on 
their missions, by teams prepared to take 
over Military Government functions at 
once, within areas under occupation by 
the tactical commands. This is so because 
it seems probable and indeed, more than 
likely, that the airborne forces of the fu .. 
ture will play an ever-expanding part in 
the warfare which world statesmen today 
are seeking to avoid, perhaps in v~in. Thus 
I suggest that airborne operations will 
undoubtedly require Military Government 
of occupied areas similar to that performed 
by units with yesterday's ground forces. 
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The training of airborne Military Gov-
ernment personnel must not overempha-
size the technical aspects of government. 
Such technical things as giving men bal-
lots to wave neither feeds them nor gives 
them· the intelligence or the character to 
be competent and devoted supporters of a 
democracy. The training of Military Gov-
ernment personnel, first of all, must be di-
rected toward attaining combat proficiency. 
The Military Government officer or en-
listed man who cannot take an active part 
in establishing and expanding a foothold in 
the tac tical offensive, and defend li.imself 
and his position has no place in an air-
borne operation. If he is not prepared for 
those duties he will find himself eliminated 
from it very quickly after the landing. 
N ext the personnel must be able to com-
. pletely understand the immediate tactical 
objectives of the command so that they 
will render the greatest possible assist-
ance. For instance, they must have this 
abilily in order to plan for the proper 
handling of refugees, the civilian supplies, 
local and otherwise, and to obtain the 
general restoration of law and order out 
of the chaos which is inherent in the area 
while the tactical objectives are being at-
tained. The necessity for this understand-
ing of the tactical objectives ex ists in per-
haps an even greater degree, in the wider 
fields of the higher command. Also, unless 
the airborne Military Government per-
sonnel understand the objectives so they 
may properly prepare to render the full 
constructive service for the forces which 
will later join or follow the airborne 
troops. 
To give a more realistic picture, I am 
adding excerpts from the records of those 
CA/MG o(licers who went airborne in 
the invasion of Normandy in 1944. It is 
hoped that they may prove interesting. 
These are the experiences of three of-
ficers who landed in France with the 82nd 
Airborne Division on D-Day; Lt. Col.. 
Thurmond, Major Deutsch and Captain 
Knecht. These oHicers, on 23 May 1944, 
had been assigned for TD with the 82nd 
Airborne Division, then at Leicester. On 
29 May they left with several units of the 
division for the Marshaling Area, Green-
ham's Common, an airfield near N ewbury. 
There they were given further briefing, 
final instructions, and assigned to various 
gli~lers. 
1
'About 2100 the column crossed the 
coast line of France over the Utah Ileach, 
and headed westward. At approximately 
2120 hours the gliders were subjected to 
heavy antiaircraft fire, and almost im-
mediately thereafte.r were released from the 
towing planes. 
"The experience of each of the three 
gliders in landing was almost identical. It 
was the result of antiaircraft fire. All 
three crashed in small adjoining fields 
within the German lines. 
"Enemy fire on the occupants of the 
gliders took place the moment the landing 
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had been effected and continued there-
after. Captain Knecht, who was in the 
personnel glider (38), and the other occu-
pants of that glider, immediately took to a 
ditch on one side of the field. Colonel 
Thurmond and Major Deutsch, in gliders 
No. 32 and 34' respectively, despite in-
juries sustained in the landings, assisted 
at once in the release of the vehicles from 
the gliders. All three gliders had been prac-
tically demolished in the landings. Colonel 
Thurmond and Major Deutsch managed 
to get together. Colonel Thurmond there-
upon headed a reconnaissance party with 
personnel of the glider to locate a CP to 
which an effort was being made to effect 
a rendezvous. A vehicle was borrowed 
from an officer of the 4th Infantry Di-
vision and a reconnaissance made of other 
nearby gliders, assisting their injured per-
sonnel in getting to the rendezvous. 
"In the meantime, Major Deutsch 
gathered as much of the nearby personnel 
which had come in his and other gliders, 
and under cover of hedges, ditches and 
other natural obstructions, made their way 
to a nearby farmyard. There, a patrol was 
established to protect the area, and to 
bring in the wounded and injured, pend-
ing selection of the final rendezvous. 
"At the same time, Captain Knecht 
proceeded on a reconnaissance from his 
position and under fire, managed to locate 
the farmyard just mentioned. He then 
returned to the ditch where the remaining 
personnel of his glider were waiting, and 
brought them back to the farmyard. 
"Shortly thereafter, word came from 
Colonel Thurmond that a tentative 
rendezvous had been established near the 
CP of . a Battalion of the 4th Infantry" 
Division, at a crossroads a short distance 
from Blosville. The group in the farm-
yard thereupon proceeded by jeep and on 
foot, under guide of friendly civilians, to 
the rendezvous established. The enemy 
fire had remained continuous, but was 
· somewhat less intense. The wounded were 
carried in the vehicles taken from the 
gliders. 
"Thereafter efforts were made to con-
solidate the group, and a temporary 
bivouac was established, foxholes being 
dug in ditches, and under hedges and 
trees. Shells were falling in the immediate 
vicinity, and there was small-arms firing 
from apparently all directions. Patrols were 
set up around the fields, and the under-
signed participated in the defense of the 
position throughout the night. 
"On the next morning it was found that 
the bivouac in question was still sur-
rounded by the enemy, within range of 
small arms, and efforts were made to reach 
division headquarters by radio. Division 
Headquarters, which were also surrourtded, 
sent out reconnaissance, and the entire 
day was consumed in moving from one 
place to another in an effort to consolidate 
the positions. The detachment moved into 
no less than six positions during the day, 
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constantly under fire and constantly seek-
ing the protection of ditches, hedges and 
foxholes. At about 1900 hours that eve-
ning it was determined that the detach-
ment could only be saved by getting it 
through to division headquarters some-
how. A reconnaissance group was sent 
across to lead the detachment by sec-
ondary roads. A part of it was along a 
main road in the vicinity of Chef du Pont, 
which was under intense small-anns 
fire. The detachment was loaded into 
some six vehicles, which started across 
the area in question. On three occasions 
within not more than a quarter of a mile, 
machine-gun fire from both sides of the 
road was so intense that the column had to 
stop, dismount, take cover in the ditches 
and return the fire. On each occasion the 
firing was finally lessened or eliminated, 
and the column remounted and dashed 
on. The movement through this portion 
of the enemy line was finally successful, 
and the column reached division head-
quarters shortly after 2100 hours that 
night, having twice crossed the enemy line 
within less than 24 hours. 
"The division headquarters area was 
better secured, surrounded by friendly 
troops but with the enemy still on all 
sides, and snipers abundant. 
"Contact was made immediately upon 
arrival with the Police Chief who was in 
the square. It was discovered that the 
mayor, M . le Dr. Cailliard, had been 
killed during an air raid several days be-
fore, and that his successor would be his 
first 'adjoint.' He was sent for and a gen-
eral meeting arranged for 1230 hours. 
"General conditions were determined 
to be reasonably good. There were only a 
few wounded civilians and the hospital was 
still functioning with three doctors, all 
nurses and adequate medicine, dressings, 
etc. There were also ten policemen on 
duty. Few civilians had as yet appeared, 
but arrangements were made for several to 
remove enemy dead ftom the streets. 
"A meeting was held about 1300 hours 
at the Hotel de Ville with the second 'ad-
joint,' the first being laid up teinporarily, 
the town secretary, Police Chief were 
present, during which our mission was ex-
plained and our curfew and anti-cattle 
movement restriction advised. The de-
tachment was put in charge of the town 
and set up in the Hotel de Ville. 
"We reported to Corps signal officer the 
location of the junction box of the enemy 
military co'mmunication system to Cher-
bourg, as we were infonned of this by a 
civilian, and the circuits were later inter-
rupted. 
"An insp.ection was also made of some 
lesser wounded cattle and attempts con-
tinued to arrange for use of the available 
meat not required by civilians in the di-
vision area due to the weekly distribution 
having been made the day before the 
bombing. Instructions to bury the dead 
animals were also given to all mayors. 
"Heavy artillery fire by the enemy di-
rected at Carentan on D & 7 caused most 
of the civilians to go into hiding, and con-
siderable damage to the town also resulted. 
"Lt. Critchley went into Carentan, how-
ever, and remained for some hours to as-
sist the detachment in the worst phase of 
the bombardment. 
"In the remaining division area every-
thing was relatively quiet and plans for a 
meeting of mayors of all freed towns were 
made to consider the bread shortage. 
"The town of St. Martin de Vareville 
in the northern sector of the corps area 
having developed a meat shortage clue to 
slaughter of livestock during the first 
phase of shell fire, we arranged to 
make the surplus at Ste. Marie du Mont 
available through commercial channels. 
"We had to refer to Corps for action a 
proposal by M.I.I. to arrest the mayor of 
Hiesville, which we opposed vigorously. 
Corps upheld us as no definite proof of 
harmful action was presented. This mayor 
has been of considerable assistance to us 
and our saving him from arrest has been 
most beneficial. 
"The first really important group of 
evacuees in the division area arrived at 
Hiesville from Le Ham and foxholes were 
made available to them. 
"K rations were issued to the evacuees · 
the morning of D & 8. One returned vol-
untarily to Le I Jam to check conditions. I le 
reported twenty tons of wheat and five 
tons of flour at the mill which he also 
said appeared to be undamaged, though 
without electricity or adequate water to 
operate. This information was relayed to 
Col. Hardin at Corps as Le Ham is out-
side of the division area. We postponed 
our meeting with the mayors pending 
check of the situation. 
"One of the staff of enlisted men, Pvt. 
Fred Schnabel was used to guard two 
women, arrested as probable enemy agents, 
and he acquired valuable information for 
CIC through overhearing their conversa-
tions in French and German. 
"During the afternoon General Taylor 
held a meeting of Carentan town officials, 
with part of his staff, the detachment and 
division Civil Affairs officers present. 
"D & 9 Lt. Critchley went to Corps to 
attempt to arrange for running the flour 
mill at Le Ilam, but as the enemy was still 
just across the river, within small-anns 
range, nothing could be done for the 
moment. Accordingly, we contacted all 
mayors in the division area, re-setting time 
for general flour conference the next day. 
"Carentan was visited and conditions 
found to be relatively quiet, with popu-
lation as yet not returned in large numbers 
as they had done the first day. During the 
v1s1t, some 88mm fire was directed at the 
town with soldier but no civilian casual-
ties." 
The Military Government, conducted 
in and following the military operations of 
(Continued on page 10) 
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of such control that the central govern-
ment's Board of Information was abolished 
outright by the Supreme Commander for 
the Allied Powers early in the occupation. 
There remained the very serious prob-
lem of how a people born to obey could 
be expected overnight to embrace the new 
idea of freedom without some means of 
knowing what their new democratic gov-
ernment was doing and trying to do-and 
why. 
From the beginning of the occupation, 
the Civil Information and Education Sec-
tion of SCAP has given much thought and 
attention to that problem. This reporter 
recently had the privilege of participating 
with C I & E officials in further studies of 
government information in Japan and in 
trying to work out an information program 
that would be acceptable to the Japanese 
people and press. 
One suggestion that may fill the gap, at 
least until the new voters-male and female 
alike-have built up confidence in the high-
ly unpopular bureaucrats of Tokyo, is for 
a decentralized operation in which the bulk 
of the government information will be dis-
tributed by the nation's 46· prefectures. 
That will allow for closer contact be-
tween the individual and his local repre-
sentatives of governmental authority. It 
will provide a means of tailoring informa-
tion to the needs of the community, of 
emphasizing farm aids, for instance, in 
rural areas, and stressing labor programs in 
industrial prefectures. It will keep the 
whole idea of government information 
geared to a lower speed than that of Tokyo. 
It should, if successful, protect the new-
found freedom of the Japanese unless the 
bulk of the people, through neglect or 
desperation, decide to give up democracy 
and embrace the slavery of communism. 
There is, then, a possibility that enough 
to eat, an honest government, some basis 
for expecting a brighter future and ade-
quate information about those fundamen-
tal things may keep alive the democratic 
infant that was born in Japan with the 
arrival of the American conquerors. 
Education is the ultimate hope, but edu-
cation generally is a long-time thing. For 
right now, the need is for information-
straightforward, simple, understandable in-
formation. The people of Japan need to 
know more than how a democracy works. 
They need to know how a Japanese democ-
racy works- how it is working today. 
The responsible press appears to be 
eager to do its part in telling the story. 
The radio and motion pictures are ready to 
translate abstractions into concrete terms. 
All the media of information are waiting 
for the raw material that should be much 
more compelling than whatever it is the 
communists have to offer. 
With such a prospect, we may yet be 
given time to launch a program of demo-
cratic education in Japan. To be effective, 
such a program will have to extend at least 
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over a generation. The taxpayers of the 
United States must be rea<ly to support for 
an additional twenty-five or thirty years a 
token occupation that may be shrunk to 
nothing more than educational supervision. 
Unless we are willing to go along finan-
cially with such a program, it is probable 
that the entire investment in victory in the 
Pacific-the costly expenditure of life and 
resources-will have been wasted. The peo-
ple of Japan have a good chance for free-
dom, but the people of the United States . 
will have to be both generous and patient 
if that chance is to be realized. 
With The 
Airborne Command 
(Continued from page 8) 
\iVorld War II, was largely a feel-and-de-
velop-your-wa y-as-you-go-opera tion. The 
studies which are presently going on, as 
distinguished from the actual supervision 
of units still functioning in occupied areas 
in Europe and the Far East, are undoubt-
edly being directed toward removing Mili-
tary Government from the experimental 
field. I feel certain that any comprehen-
sive study of the Army's operations during 
the war in Europe will show that a mili-
tary commander cannot competently solve 
the logistic phase of his missions, unless 
he understands the po!itical as well as the 
tactical objective assigned to him. He must 
be as well prepared to accomplish the one 
as the other. His training should include 
that type of instruction. Too often inex-
perienced persons have thought of wars 
being fought on maneuver grounds from 
which the civilian has been completely 
and conveniently removed. As for the 
chief of the Military Government Section, 
he is responsible for the preparation of 
detailed plans for Military Government in 
each area to be occupied, including the 
determination of the number and types of 
Military Government Detachments needed 
in an area. He must, obviously, make 
Military Government planning a part of 
the over-all plan integrating it with other 
plans to meet all possible developments. 
World War II was largely a war of move-
ment. Consideration of the civilian popu-
lations became one of the Army Com-
mander's great responsibilities. It is en-
tirely conceivable that conditions may arise 
where providing for the civilian popula-
tions will far outweigh the military prob-
lems which confront him. Such was ac-
tually the case in the closing days of the 
European Operations. 
To accomplish its purpose, the Military 
Government staff must be as much of an 
inherent part of his staff as the other 
general staff divisions. It must be realized 
that it deals with the engineer, signal, 
medical, quartermaster, transportation, 
Provost Marshal and legal sections of the 
Commander's staff in a coordinating role. 
It must do so in order to develop an ef-
ficient administration of the operational 
areas which will come within the Com-
mander's control. The integration of the 
Military Government plans with those 
for the tactical operations can best be 
handled at General Staff levels, with the 
Military Government Section participating 
as a General Staff Section. This must be 
done because many Military Government 
problems are specialties in themselves and 
are actually well outside the normal sphere 
of training formerly given the four Gen-
eral Staff Divisions. Moreover, many of 
the problems of Civil Administration 
which devolve upon the Military Gov-
ernment Staff Section are of such impor-
tance that they require the prerogatives and 
authority enjoyed by other coordinating 
staff sections. As warfare is now carried 
on, Military Government cuts across all 
other technical and administrative opera-
tions. It must either be given the power 
to coordinate or have a parallel organiza-
tion of its own. This last method of dupli-
cation has been tried and has not proven 
successful for obvious reasons. Coordina-
ating powers are given G-1, G-2, G-3 and 
G-4 sections so that they are able to serve 
their Commander more effectively. It is 
submitted that the responsibility for keep-
ing an organized economy within a Com-
mander's area of responsibility should be 
recognized. The Military Government staff 
should be able to meet the Commander's 
responsibilities and permit him to be a 
military commander and not a political 
dictator. Military Government should be 
accomplished through effective coordina-
tion. It is a staff type of activity. If this 
concept were developed and a feeling of 
cooperative sovereignty in the people were 
encouraged, our field commanders would 
serve their country and democracy much 
better. 
But to return to more easily explained 
problems, both the staff and operating 
personnel might well be self-contained· to 
a greater degree. They should have con-
trol over certain mobile equipment and 
be able to coordinate satisfactory supply 
arrangements. In my experience these were 
never available in the late war. It was only 
by the ready genius of American personnel 
to find and utilize indigenous rolling stock 
that transportation was obtained. The 
latter, always a deficiency, was overcome 
only by the never-failing readiness of 
American units to use irregular means to 
meet the critical needs. The success of 
the Military Government was due in large 
measure to the experience and knowledge 
of Colonel D. M. Gunn, 1st Army, G-5, 
whose service in the Italian an<l African 
campaigns made him one of the best in-
formed officers on Military Government af-
fairs in the European Theater. 
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